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Abstract
We investigate whether the origin of an employee provides di↵erent motives
for wage discrimination in gift-exchange experiments with students and migrant
workers in China. In a lab and an internet experiment, subjects in the role of
employers can condition their wages on the employees’ home provinces. The
resulting systematic di↵erences in wages can be linked to natural groups and
economic characteristics of the provinces. In-group favoritism increases wages
for employees who share the same origin as the employer, while an increased
probability of being matched with an employee with a di↵erent ethnicity reduces
wages. Furthermore, wages in the laboratory increase with the actual wage level
in the employees’ home province. Nevertheless, employees’ e↵ort is not influenced
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1 Introduction
This paper explores whether the origin of an employee provides di↵erent motives for
wage discrimination. To this end, we conduct two stylized gift-exchange experiments
with students and migrant workers in the PR China. Students in the role of employers
can condition wages on the employees’ origin, while students and migrant workers in
the role of employees choose e↵ort levels based on wages. We augment the collected
datasets with complementary data on the characteristics of Chinese provinces. This
combination of lab and field data demonstrates three separate, but simultaneously
present, e↵ects on wages levels: First, wages in the experiments are influenced by
actual wage levels in employees’ home provinces, second, in-group favoritism increases
wages for employees with the same origin as the employer, and third, ethnic diversity
in the employees’ home provinces decreases wages.
Previous research has shown that discriminating behavior can be conditioned on
such diverse characteristics as gender (e.g., Neumark et al., 1996; Kuhn and Shen,
2013), race (e.g., Betrand and Mulainathan 2007, Pager et al 2009; Zussman, 2013),
age (e.g., Bu¨sch et al., 2009; Riach and Rich, 2010), and even beauty (e.g., Mobius and
Rosenblat, 2006; Wilson and Eckel, 2006).
Several potential reasons for discriminating behavior have been identified in the eco-
nomic literature. While discrimination can be taste-based (Becker, 1957), di↵erential
treatment in labor markets can also be based on economic reasoning and di↵erences in
the actual or expected productivity of workers (Phelps, 1972). Employers might even
o↵er discriminating payment schemes for identical work to provide proper incentives
within teams (Winter, 2004; Goerg et al., 2010). Furthermore, varying perceptions
of fair-wages among otherwise identical workers can result in wage di↵erences. Two
workers with di↵erent reference groups will consider di↵erent wage levels as fair when
the perception of what constitutes a fair wage depends on the wages paid to the work-
ers in these reference groups (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). A similar argument can be
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put forward based on e ciency wages: if workers from one group have worse outside
options than the others they are willing to accept lower wages for the same work or the
same wage for more work hours. Kuhn and Shen (2014) propose this as an explanation
why employers in the PR China prefer migrant workers over comparable local workers
as they expect higher levels of work hours for the same wage.
A di↵erent kind of motivation for discrimination has been identified in the social
psychology literature. Broad evidence shows that group identity may lead to the prefer-
ential treatment of in-group members and discrimination against out-group individuals
– not necessarily through hostility, but through indi↵erence (Sherif et al., 1961; Tajfel
and Turner, 1979, 1986; Halevy et al., 2008). In economics, Akerlof and Kranton
(2000) introduced social identity as an important driver of economic behavior and pro-
posed a utility function according to which individuals aim to behave appropriately
given the social group to which they belong.1 As the group a liation defines part of
one’s identity it also influences the behavior towards group members and the outside.
Thus, identity can provide the microfoundation for the previously discussed taste-based
discrimination (see Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, p. 732).
The importance of group a liation has been demonstrated for naturally occurring
groups defined by such diverse features as race (Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Chen
et al, 2014), gender (Charness and Rustichini, 2011), army platoons (Goette et al.,
2006) and city districts (Falk and Zehnder, 2013). Furthermore, even artificial groups
generated with the minimal-group paradigm (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) lead to in-group
favoritism with potentially increased cooperation in social dilemmas (Yamagishi and
Kiyonari, 2000; Eckel and Grossmann, 2006; Chen and Li, 2009) and more e cient
coordination in the minimum e↵ort game (Chen and Chen, 2011).
This paper contributions to the literature on natural identities and discrimination by
1It is worth mentioning that the implications of social identity go beyond discrimination. It applies
to most situations in which people behave as they think they should. Thus, social identity provides
insights into topics such as the division of labor in households, education, monitoring at the workplace
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2002, 2008), as well as, discounting and risk preferences (Benjamin et
al., 2010).
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demonstrating that the previously discussed motives for discrimination are not mutual
exclusive. Instead they can be present at the same time and be based on the same piece
of information. In our paper, employers only know the employees’ origin resulting
in wage discrimination motivated by di↵erent characteristics of the home provinces.
First, we observe in-group favoritism in form of higher wages for employees with the
same origin. Second, discrimination is also based on the ethnical composition in the
employees’ home province and employers tend to chose lower wages for workers from
provinces with larger shares of ethnic minorities. Third, we show that, in addition,
wages in our experiments are positively correlated with average wages paid in the home
provinces. Furthermore, these di↵erent characteristics influence wages independently
of each other. Thus, our paper is one of few experimental papers which successfully
demonstrate the occurrence of discrimination based on multiple but simultaneously
present motives. One notably exception is the work by Falk and Zehnder (2013).
In their city wide trust game, first movers condition their trust on the residential
districts of second movers in the city of Zu¨rich. The exhibited trust levels di↵ered
systematically between the districts of Zu¨rich – higher socio-economic status led to
more trust and, for subjects from the same district, in-group favoritism in terms of
higher trust was observed. In our experiments, we apply a similar methodology in
the context of a stylized employer-employee relationship, however decisions are not
conditioned on districts of a city, but on provinces of a whole country.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we discuss the
experimental design. This includes the description of the modified gift-exchange game,
the implementation of the experiments with students and migrant workers as subjects,
and the complementary data on the characteristics of the Chinese provinces. Section
3 presents behavioral hypotheses, section 4 reports our results on the determinants
of employers’ wage discrimination and employees’ e↵ort provision. Finally, section 5
discusses the implications of our results and concludes the paper.
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2 Experimental Design
We investigate how employers discriminate employees in two gift-exchange experiments
in which wages are conditioned on the employees’ home provinces. Using additional
field data, we identify particular characteristics of the provinces on which these wages
are based on.
The first experiment is a laboratory experiment conducted at the Shanghai Jiao
Tong University (PR China) with students deciding in the role of employers and mi-
grant workers in the role of employees.2 The second experiment is an internet exper-
iment at the University of Nottingham Ningbo (PR China) with students deciding in
both roles – as employers and employees. The second experiment serves as a robustness
check and allows to investigate if the previous results hold if employers face employees
with similar socio-economic background. Table 3 in the Appendix gives the origins
of all subjects participating in both experiments. In the following, we will first de-
scribe our simplified gift-exchange game and the implementation of the experiments.
Afterwards, we describe the complementary field data on the characteristics of the
employees’ origins.
2.1 The Game
Similar to Fehr et al. (1998), we model the employer-employee relationship as a bilateral
gift exchange. In the bilateral gift-exchange game one subject decides in the role of an
employer and a second subject in the role of an employee. The employer moves first by
o↵ering the worker a wage, w 2 [11, ..., 20]. The worker then selects an e↵ort level, e,
which can either be normal (e = 0) or high (e = 1).3 Working hard induces an higher
2In our paper we refer to workers who migrated to Shanghai from other provinces as migrant
workers. In the labor literature on China the term migrant worker usually refers to workers migrating
from rural areas to urban areas even if they move within a province.
3Other studies applying the gift exchange game usually implement the e↵ort as a continuous de-
cisions with convex e↵ort costs (e.g., Fehr et al., 1997; Fehr et al., 1998; Brown et al. 2004; and
Maximiano et al., 2007). We reduce the e↵ort to a binary decision to ensure that the migrant workers
understand the game and the consequences of their decisions. As Zhao (2003) reports 91% of migrant
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e↵ort cost (c = 10), while working normal induces lower e↵ort cost (c = 5). The payo↵s
of the employer were framed such that normal e↵ort increases the employers profit by
5, while high e↵ort increases the employer’s profit by a total of 20. Thus, according to
this framing employers’ payo↵ (in RMB) is given as:
⇡Employer = 20 + (5 + 15e)  w, with w 2 [11, 20], and e 2 {0, 1}
and employees’ payo↵ (in RMB) is given as:
⇡Employee = w  
8<: 10 if working hard, e = 15 if working normal, e = 0
To investigate how employers discriminate and base wages on the origin of the
employee, wages were set conditional on the origin of the employee. Thus, using the
strategy method (Selten, 1967), employers choose for 27 provinces and regions in the PR
China wages they would assign to employees from these provinces.4 Using the strategy
method forces subjects to think about each of the provinces, making the possibility of
discrimination very salient and thereby potentially resulting in demand e↵ects (Zizzo,
2010). However, it is unclear whether this decreases or increases the likelihood of
discrimination.5 Furthermore, even if it increases the likelihood of discrimination it
is unlikely to influence the observed discrimination pattern instead of just making it
easier to detect. We ultimately decided to use the strategy method as it provides an
workers in 1999 had no more than nine years of schooling and 17% no more than six years. Further-
more, we implemented a positive minimum wage to avoid a show-up fee and give all payo↵s in the
actual currency RMB instead of an experimental currency with a conversion rate.
4The list of provinces and regions includes all provinces and autonomous regions. We excluded
cities that have the same rank as provinces. The excluded direct-controlled municipalities are Beijing,
Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin. Figure 1 in the appendix shows a map of the PR China with
the used provinces and regions. In this paper we use provinces synonymously for provinces and
autonomous regions.
5In this context it is worth noting that Experiment I was conducted directly after an employment
law became e↵ective which bans discrimination based on ethnic background, race, gender, and religious
belief (The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Promotion of Employment).
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easy way to obtain su ciently large numbers of observations.
After wages were set employers and employees were randomly matched. Thereafter,
the employee decided to either work hard or normal given the wages, but without any
further information on the employer’s characteristics.
2.2 Implementation
Table 1: Details on subjects and elicitation methods in the experiments
Experiment I Experiment II
Students - Migrant Workers Students - Students
Subjects:
# Employer 98 Students 380 Students
# Employee 98 Migrant Workers 380 Students
Location: Shanghai, PR China Ningbo, PR China
Elicitation method:
Wage Strategy method Strategy method
E↵ort Direct response Strategy method
Employers used the strategy method to choose wages conditional on the 27 possible home
provinces/regions of the employees. Migrant workers choose their e↵ort with the direct response
method given their actual wage. Students in the role of employees used the strategy method
choosing their e↵ort conditional on the 10 possible wages.
The first experiment was conducted at the Shanghai Jiao Tong University (PR
China) and the second one at the University of Nottingham Ningbo (PR China). Both
experiments were organized and run by local research assistants, who were not informed
about the research question. Table 1 summarizes the two experiments and gives the
number of participating subjects.
In our first experiment students in the role of employers were paired with migrant
workers in the role of employees. Students were recruited with postings on bulletin
boards and the usual recruiting system of the Vernon-Smith-Lab of the Shanghai Jiao-
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Tong University. Migrant workers were recruited among construction workers and
cleaning personal.6 Participating students were scheduled to arrive 10 minutes prior
to the migrant workers’ arrival and seated in cubicles. Upon arrival, migrant workers
were lead into a room next to the laboratory.7
In both rooms the instructions were distributed and read aloud. After the as-
sistants had asked control questions the experiment started. In the employer room,
students chose the wages based on the worker’s origin using the strategy method. In
the meantime each migrant worker had to report her/his home province before being
anonymously and randomly matched to one employer. Then, the migrant worker was
informed about the wage the employer had assigned to her/him. However, the worker
was neither informed about the possibility that employers could assign di↵erent wages
to provinces, nor the province the employer was coming from.8
Thereafter, a questionnaire was distributed. Among demographics, we elicited em-
ployers’ self-reported general trust towards the people of the 27 provinces/regions.9
Meanwhile, final payo↵s were calculated and afterwards paid to the participants. The
whole experiment was conducted using pen and paper and lasted roughly one hour.
Our second experiment, was conducted as an internet experiment at the University
of Nottingham Ningbo (PR China). The setup was almost identical to the first exper-
iment. However, this time students decided in the roles of employers and employees.
First, all subjects decided in the roles of employers, then they were informed that they
would also decide in the roles of employees. Subjects did not receive feedback be-
fore completing their decisions as employees. Furthermore, employees’ decisions were
6See appendix A for details on recruiting and instructions
7The doors of the laboratory were open and students were made aware of the bypassing workers.
The purpose of this procedure was to ensure that both students and migrant workers could see each
other. Thereby, students were a rmed that they would interact with real migrant workers and the
migrant workers were made aware that wages were actually chosen by students.
8Again, to keep the setup as simple as possible for the migrant workers they were only asked to
choose their e↵ort levels for the actual wage, i.e., no strategy method for the e↵ort decision.
9We asked employers for each province and region: Do you trust people from this province? The
answer was given on a scale from 0 (not trusting at all) to 10 (trusting very much).
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elicited using the strategy method, i.e. every employee had to choose an e↵ort level for
each possible wage.
2.3 Complimentary Field Data
With the data gathered in the experiments we are able to identify wage discrimination,
i.e., whether employees from di↵erent provinces receive di↵erent wages. Yet, to identify
potential motives driving this discrimination we complement our experimental findings
with additional data on the characteristics of the employees’ home provinces. These
characteristics were taken from two di↵erent datasets.
Figure 1: Di↵erent characteristics of provinces/regions
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The 2007 Statistical Yearbook of the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics10 pro-
vides us with economic characteristics for the provinces, including average annual
wages, the percentage of rural population, and the gross regional product in compari-
son to the gross domestic product.11 Average hourly wages were not publicly available,
however, in 1995 China adopted a 40-hour week for the whole country and thus the
annual average wages provide a proxy for the hourly wages.12
To capture ethnical di↵erences between provinces we gathered the percentage of
the Non-Han population from the 2010 Province Population Census Dataset.13 The
largest ethnicity is the group of Han Chinese who represent 90% of the population in
China. However, 55 other ethnic groups are o cially recognized by the government of
the PR China and in most provinces these ethnic groups are minorities.14 Instead of
distinguishing further between the smaller ethnic groups we focus on the total fraction
of people in a province who are not Han Chinese.
Figure 1 gives histograms for the added variables and demonstrates for most of
them a substantial heterogeneity.
3 Hypotheses
In the following we derive our hypotheses based on the existing literature. As discussed
in the introduction of this paper previous research has identified di↵erent motives for
discrimination – in this study, we will focus on three of these motives: economic charac-
teristics, in-group a liations, and ethnic diversity. In Appendix E we present a model
10We use the 2007 data as it was publicly available when the first experiments were conducted.
11In addition, we obtained the population size and the number of unemployed. Since both variables
were not directly correlated with the wage in the experiment, we do not report them here. For more
details refer to the Appendix.
12With 52.14 weeks per year this results in hourly wages between 7.48 RMB and 15.11 RMB. The
average earnings of employees in our experiment are in this region; migrant workers earn on average
7.78 RMB and students 8.81 RMB. The range of possible wages was between 11 and 20 RMB resulting
in possible earnings for the employees between 1 RMB and 15 RMB.
13China Data Center, University of Michigan
14Only in Tibet and Xinjiang do Han Chinese not account for the majority of the population.
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which formally incorporates theses potential influences. Other forms of discrimination
that are based on individuals’ characteristics (e.g., age, gender) are not viable in our
setting as employers do not have the necessary information.
In our setting employers have to decide on wages in the hope that employers will
respond in-kind and exert high e↵ort. According to the fair-wage hypotheses (Ak-
erlof, 1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990) an employee will respond kindly to wages above
the employee’s perceived fair wage and withdraw e↵ort when wages fall short of this
benchmark. This fair wage depends on the comparisons with a reference group and,
consequently, it will depend on the wages paid at the location of the experiment. In
addition, the wage levels of the home provinces might influence the benchmark.15 Mi-
grant workers only move to a location if it results in higher income and, thus, every
newly o↵ered wage must justify the migration to the new location. If the reference
wage were only influenced by the wage level at the location of the experiment it should
not lead to di↵erential treatments of employees based on their origin. However, if in
addition the evaluation were at least partly influenced by the wages in the employ-
ees’ home provinces employers would have to take this into account paying more to
employees from provinces with higher wages.
Hypotheses 1 Wages in the experiment increase with average wage levels in the provinces.
Our next two hypotheses are aiming at in-group favoritism and out-group discrimi-
nation as driving forces for wage discrimination. When employers decide on the wages,
they know if they have the same home province as the employee.16 Thus, the origins of
15On average, migrant workers send 50-55% of their income as remittances to their families at home
(Du et al. 2005). The families at home, i.e., mostly workers’ parents and workers’ children, have to buy
goods and services with these remittances and so the conditions in the provinces are still important
when evaluating wages. Another simple reason why wages might be partly evaluated on the basis of
the home wages could be inertia. As people move to the new location they might need time to get
accustomed to the local wage level.
16In China the home province is inherited from the parents and, based on the Hukou system, the
only place for which individuals have the legal right to permanently reside. Only in the home province
do individuals enjoy citizens’ rights such as welfare benefits and school access for their kids. The home
province is rather fixed and very hard to change.
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the employees generate natural in-groups (employees with the same origin as the em-
ployer) and out-groups (employees with di↵erent origin as the employer). The broad
literature on in-group favoritism has demonstrated that subjects tend to treat in-group
members more favorable. Furthermore, Falk and Zehnder (2013) demonstrated that
subjects trust strangers from the same city district more than subjects from other
districts. Along these lines, we expect employers to exhibit in-group favoritism:
Hypotheses 2 Employers assign higher wages to employees from the same home province
Another attribute that defines in-groups is the ethnicity of employer and employee.
Similar to Fershtman and Gneezy (2001), Fersthman et al. (2005), and Chen et al.
(2014) we expect subjects to favor those with the same ethnic background. In our
experiments, all employers were Han-Chinese and we expect them to favor employees
who are Han-Chinese, too. However, in our experiment employers are not able to ob-
serve the ethnicity of an employee. Consequently, we expect a more gradual type of
discrimination based on the percentage of Non-Han population in the home province
of the employee. An increasing percentage of the Non-Han population raises the prob-
ability of being paired with an employee with a di↵erent ethnicity, i.e., an out-group
member.17
Hypotheses 3 Assigned wages decline with increasing shares of Non-Han Chinese in
the employees’ home province.
In the following we discuss the expected behavior of the employees. Employees in
our experiment did not receive information on the origin of the employer. Therefore,
in-group favoritism is an unlikely influence on the e↵ort decision. Nevertheless, we
have two predictions based on the fair wage hypotheses. The first one is in line with
the general findings in the laboratory gift-exchange literature demonstrating a positive
17Similar to this argument is the observation by Grimm and Mengel (2009) that in viscous popu-
lations with endogenous groups individuals are more likely to interact with similar types/individuals.
In the investigated prisoner’s dilemma, this selection ultimately increases cooperation.
11
e↵ort response to increasing wages (for recent reviews, see Charness and Kuhn, 2011;
Cooper and Kagel, forthcoming).
Hypotheses 4 Increasing wages lead to increasing e↵ort regardless of the origin of
the employees
And finally, given a fixed wage we would expect di↵erent e↵ort levels among provinces
if the reasoning behind hypotheses 1 is correct and employees evaluate the appropri-
ateness of wages based on the average wages paid in their home province.
Hypotheses 5 Given the same wage in the experiment employees from provinces with
higher average wages should exert less e↵ort.
4 Results
4.1 Employers’ Behavior
Figure 2 gives the distribution of wages in the two experiments. Mean wages between
the two experiments di↵er only slightly, with migrant workers receiving lower wages
as employees (13.98) compared to students (14.24, p = 0.23 two-sided Fisher-Pitman
permutation test for independent samples, FPI)18. However, the figure reveals that the
two distributions look quite di↵erently (p < 0.001, Epps-Singleton Empirical Charac-
teristic Function test).19 Migrant workers in the role of employees receive significantly
more often the lowest possible wage of 11 (p < 0.001, FPI), but also significantly more
often the maximum wage of 20 (p < 0.01, FPI).
We now turn our attention to the question whether di↵erent wages are assigned
to employees from di↵erent provinces. Figure 3 gives the mean wages per province
18The Fisher-Pitman permutation tests are more powerful alternatives to the Wilcoxon signed-rank
test and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test. For more details refer to Kaiser (2007).
19The Epps-Singleton Empirical Characteristic Function test is an alternative to the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test and usually has a greater power. In contrast to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test it can be
applied to discrete data. For more details refer to Goerg and Kaiser (2009).
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Figure 2: Distribution of wages in the two experiments
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(right). The wages are ranked from the lowest to the highest and while the order in
both experiments is not exactly the same, assigned mean wages for the provinces are
highly correlated between the two experiments (r = 0.8708 with p < 0.001). The
figure clearly demonstrates heterogeneity in the assigned wages and 140/301 out of
the 338 possible pairwise comparisons of wages between two provinces are significant
in our experiment with migrant workers/students as employees (all p < 0.05 FPP).20
Although the figure reveals that on average di↵erent wages are assigned to the provinces
some employers are insensitive to the employees’ origin. In fact, 44% of the employers
matched with migrant workers assign the same wage to all employees regardless of their
origin, while only 3% do so when matched with students. However, 55% of those who
do not discriminate in Experiment I assign the lowest wage to all migrant workers and
20Obviously, these comparisons are problematic with regard to multiple testing. However, after
applying the very conservative Bonferroni correction 21 (students - migrant worker) and 261 (students
- students) pairwise comparison remain significant on the 5% level in both experiments.
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33% do so in Experiment II. Figure 2 in the Appendix presents the distribution of
wages assigned by employers who do not discriminate.
Figure 3: Median wages per province, ordered by median wages
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We now test whether certain province characteristics explain the ranking of wages given
in figure 3. We first investigate each hypotheses separately with non-parametric tests.
Thereafter, we run a series of regression analysis to confirm that the described results
are indeed due to separate e↵ects which remain significant when controlling for them
simultaneously.
The provinces with the highest wage levels in the field tend to receive the highest
wages in our experiment. The provinces in which the second, third and fourth highest
wages are paid in the real economy (Zhejiang 27,820 RMB; Guangdong 26,186 RMB;
Jiangsu 23,782 RMB) are in both experiments among the provinces that receive the
highest median wages (  15 RMB). In both experiments, employers assign significantly
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lower wages to workers from provinces with real life wages below the median – no matter
whether these workers were migrant workers (p = 0.055, two sided Fisher-Pitman
permutation test for paired replicates, FPP) or students (p < 0.001).
Result 1 Employees assign higher wages to provinces with higher average wages in
the field. This occurs in both experiments.
In Experiment I, the largest number of employers is originally from the province
Jiangsu. In Experiment II, most employers originated from Zhejiang.21 In both of
the experiments these two provinces are among the ones with the highest assigned me-
dian wages. Comparing the wages employers assigned to employees from their home
provinces with the mean wages assigned to the other provinces clearly reveals signs of
in-group favoritism with higher mean wages for the home province. When matched
with migrant workers from the home provinces wages are on average 6% higher than
for the other provinces (p < 0.001, FPP). This e↵ect is even more pronounced when
employers are matched with students as the home provinces of the employers receive
on average 19% higher wages (p < 0.001, FPP).
Result 2 Employers exhibit signs of in-group bias by assigning higher wages to their
home provinces.
Given the relationship between actual wages and wages in the experiment, Tibet is
clearly an exception. According to the field data on provinces, workers in Tibet receive
the highest average wages (31,518 RMB), but in both of our experiments assigned
median wages were very low (12 RMB). However, Tibet is among the three provinces
with the highest percentages of Non-Han Chinese (Tibet 92%; Xinjiang 60%; Qinghai
47%) and all three provinces received the lowest median wage (12 RMB). Overall, in
21In Experiment I employers from Henan have the highest probability to be matched with an
employee from the same province (45%), in Experiment II it is employers from Zhejiang (63%). The
average probability of being matched with an employer from the same province is 5.6% in Experiment
I and 41% in Experiment II. See Table 3 in the Appendix for the origins of the subjects.
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both experiments employers assigned significantly lower wages to provinces with above
median populations of minorities (both experiments p < 0.001, FPP).
Result 3 Employees assign lower wages to provinces with higher shares of minorities.
Our previously presented results could be due to the fact that province characteris-
tics are correlated with each other. Table 4 in the Appendix presents these correlations.
To control simultaneously for all three discussed motive for discrimination we conduct
a series of regressions with employer fixed-e↵ects and robust standard errors clustered
at the province level. Models 1 to 3 in Table 2 give the estimates for Experiment I and
Models 4 to 6 for Experiment II.
In Models 1 and 4 the coe cients for Average Wage Origin, Same Origin, and %
NonHan Origin are all significant at the same time confirming that they are indeed
distinct motives for discrimination. We observe the same pattern in both Experiments,
but the absolute size of the coe cients for employers matched with students is sig-
nificantly larger compared to the ones for employers matched with migrant workers.
Table 6 in the appendix demonstrates that the di↵erences in magnitudes between the
two experiments are statistically significant.
The reported results on discrimination in Table 2 are on the aggregate level, but
a closer look at the individual level reveals that roughly 93% of the discriminating
employers base their decision on at least one of the three motives with substantial
fractions of employers being influenced by several motives at the same time.22 In
Experiment I, 29% of employers discriminate based on Average Wage Origin, Same
Origin, and % NonHan Origin at the same time, while 35% discriminate based on
two of the three motives. In Experiment II, 23% of employers are influenced by three
motives and 49% on two motives at the same time.
22To classify the discrimination, we individually regress for each employer wp = y0+y1c1p+y2c2p+
y3c3p + ✏p, with wp being the assigned wage to a province and c1p, c2p and c3p being the motives
Average Wage Origin, Same Origin, and % NonHan Origin. If an estimated coe cient is significant
on the 10% level we classify this employer as someone who discriminates based on this motive. Table
7 in the Appendix reports the results of this classification approach.
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Table 2: Explaining the Wage in the Experiment
Wage in Experiment Students - Migrant Workers Students - Students
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average Wage Origin 0.400*** 0.338*** 0.175** 1.635*** 1.244*** 0.665***
(0.0623) (0.0715) (0.0718) (0.273) (0.243) (0.192)
Same Origin 0.502** 0.437** 0.382* 1.373*** 1.223*** 1.266***
(0.211) (0.212) (0.211) (0.193) (0.161) (0.146)
% NonHan Origin -1.231*** -1.050*** -0.641*** -3.749*** -2.784*** -1.416***
(0.121) (0.168) (0.187) (0.497) (0.509) (0.381)
% Rural Origin -0.498 0.0419 -3.306*** -3.383***
(0.353) (0.433) (1.033) (1.110)
Trust in Origin 0.0493** 0.0476** 0.101*** 0.116***
(0.0206) (0.0202) (0.0218) (0.0193)
Constant 13.40*** 13.49*** 13.52*** 11.65*** 13.60*** 14.62***
(0.114) (0.323) (0.351) (0.492) (0.915) (0.791)
Additional Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Employer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,646 2,646 2,646 10,260 10,260 10,260
Subjects 98 98 98 380 380 380
Prob > F p < 0.001 p < 0.001 p < 0.001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.001
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table reports regressions of wage decisions by employers on employees’ province characteristics. All
columns give panel regressions with employer fixed e↵ects and robust clusters on the level of the province
the wage was assigned to. Additional covariates are the gross regional product relative to the gross
domestic product and region dummies (Central China, East China, South China, Western China, North
China, Northeast China). Table 5 in the appendix reports all coe cents.
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In Models 2 and 5, we control for the ruralness of the employees’ origin as rural-
to-urban migration is associated with a social stigma and discrimination (Wang et al.,
2010). The large rural-urban divide in China results in discrimination towards rural
migrants (Meng and Zhang, 2001) as the hukou system reduces urban job opportunities,
thereby lowering the bargaining power and ultimately pushing the wages below the
workers marginal products (Dollar and Jones, 2013). Thus, our previously reported
results could be indications for discrimination based on the rural background of the
employees and we control for this possible confound. In line with the previous literature,
we observe lower wages for employees from more rural provinces in Experiment II.23 Yet,
the influence of ruralness is a separate e↵ect from Average Wage Origin, Same Origin,
and % NonHan Origin; their coe cients remain significant in both experiments.
In addition, we control in Models 2 and 5 for the trust towards the provinces. In
both experiments, employers’ self-reported trust towards people with the same home
province is more than 25% higher compared to those from other provinces.24 Yet,
the positive impact of trust on wages exceeds a mere in-group favoritism e↵ect as the
coe cients for both Trust in Origin and Same Origin in table 2 remain positive and
significant.
After adding further controls for gross regional product and regions in Models 3
and 6, results remain qualitatively the same. In the appendix we report additional
robustness checks and demonstrate that our results are not influenced by the mere
ranking of wage levels, the number of unemployed, the population size, or the fact that
not all decisions of the strategy method are equally likely to be payo↵ relevant. Thus,
we can confirm hypotheses 1, 2, and 3.
23One potential reason why ruralness does not significantly influence assigned wages in Experiment
I could be the origin of migrant workers in Shanghai. The Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Statistics
reported in 2011 that 79.4% of the interprovincial migrants were coming from rural occupations. Thus,
employers in Experiment I might have consider all employees as rural resulting in no variation along
this variable. This would also explain the large fraction of employees receiving the lowest possible
wage.
24Based on fixed e↵ects regressions explaining trust with a dummy for the same province. The
coe cient is in both experiments highly significant.
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Result 4 In Experiment II lower wages are assigned to provinces with larger fractions
of rural population. In both of our experiments employers tend to assign higher wages
to employees from provinces they perceive as more trustworthy. All previously reported
results remain robust to additional controls.
4.2 Employees’ Behavior
We now turn to the behavior of the second movers and analyze whether the variables
on which wages are conditioned actually influence the e↵ort decisions of the employees.
Figure 4 gives the average e↵ort decision for each possible wage. Please recall that
the e↵ort decisions in Experiment I were based on the actual wage levels, while in
Experiment II they were elicited with the strategy method. Thus, the number of e↵ort
responses per wage vary a lot in the graph on the left, but are constantly 380 in the
graph on the right.25
In line with the previous gift-exchange literature we observe a significantly positive
increase of e↵ort with increasing wages in both experiments (Experiment I: r = 0.20
with p < 0.01, Experiment II: r = 0.65 with p < 0.001).26 In the following we
investigate if there are additional influences on the employees’ e↵ort decision beyond the
wage paid by the employee. Specifically, we want to see whether those characteristics
influencing the employers’ decisions are predictive for employees’ e↵ort.
In both experiments employees come from provinces with varying average wages (in
both experiments the lowest average wage in the home province of an employee was
15,590 RMB and the highest was 27,820 RMB). On average, migrant workers originated
from provinces with significantly lower wages (19,632 RMB) than student employees
(24,281 RMB, p < 0.001, FPP). However, while the employers’ wage decisions are
25The strategy method allows a cleaner analysis of employees’ decisions as we observe counterfactuals
for every possible wage. One could argue that in our first experiment potential influences on the e↵ort
are already taken into account by the wage setting employer and thus we would not be able to identify
these influences on the e↵ort. The strategy method in the second experiment circumvents this potential
criticism. Nevertheless, for completeness, we report the results of our analysis for both experiments.
26Logistic regression with clusters on the employee level in Experiment II.
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Figure 4: Average e↵ort per wage in the two experiments
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influenced by the average wages in the home provinces we do not observe any signs
for such an influence on employees’ e↵ort decisions (Experiment I: r = 0.4, p = 0.45;
Experiment II: r = 0.08, p = 0.37).
Another variable that influences employers’ wage decision is the ethnical hetero-
geneity of the home provinces. And in both experiments employees are coming from
provinces with diverse ethnical backgrounds, the lowest percentages of Non-Han Chi-
nese in home provinces are below 1% and the highest are 59%. Yet, no significant
correlation exists between the percentage of Non-Han Chinese and exerted e↵ort, nei-
ther in Experiment I (r =  3.6, p = 0.34) nor in Experiment II (r = 0.35, p = 59).
In addition, home provinces di↵er substantially with regard to the percentage of rural
population, the lowest percentage is 37% and higherst 72.5%. While the ruralness of
a province influenced the assigned wage it does not influence the e↵ort (Experiment I:
r =  0.96, p = 0.68; Experiment II: r =  0.77, p = 0.17).
Potentially, average wages, as well as, ethnical and rural composition in the home
provinces influence the e↵ort only conditional on the assigned wage. Therefore, we con-
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Table 3: Explaining high effort
Students - Migrant Workers Students - Students
Prob(High E↵ort) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Wage in Experiment 0.2444*** 1.0343***
(0.080) (0.038)
Worker’s Origin Real Wage 1.0678 1.2493 -0.0565 -0.1559
(1.652) (1.738) (0.163) (0.413)
Worker’s Origin % NonHan -4.4436 -5.3597 1.1770 2.9427
(6.660) (8.688) (0.822) (2.082)
Worker’s Origin % Rural 3.8897 6.2452 -1.5996 -4.0650
(7.110) (7.632) (1.021) (2.582)
Worker Female -0.5333 -0.7870 -0.1028 -0.2532
(0.630) (0.685) (0.114) (0.289)
Worker’s Age 0.0305 0.0437* 0.0014 0.0038
(0.022) (0.024) (0.005) (0.014)
Constant -5.9813 -11.6432 0.5791 -14.5151***
(7.437) (8.140) (0.835) (2.178)
Observations 98 98 3,800 3,800
Subjects 98 98 380 380
Prob >  2 0.510 0.0228 0.432 p < 0.001
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table reports logit regressions explaining the probability of high e↵ort.
Estimates for Experiment II are based on random-e↵ects logistic regression
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duct as a last step of our analyses a series of logit regressions with additional controls.
Table 3 gives the estimates. Again no significant influences of province characteristics
are observed – only assigned wages in the experiment increase the employees’ e↵ort.27
While the positive relationship between assigned wage and e↵ort was expected and
is in line with our hypotheses, the missing connection between average wage levels in
the home province and e↵ort in the experiment is not in line with our hypothesis. Thus,
we can confirm hypotheses 4, but have to reject hypotheses 5.
Result 5 The characteristics that influence employers’ wage decisions do not predict
e↵ort. Only the wage assigned in the experiment influences the e↵ort decision.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we demonstrated that an employees’ origin can simultaneously trigger
di↵erent motives for wage discrimination. In our bilateral gift-exchange experiments
employers conditioned wages on employees’ home provinces. Combining our experi-
mental data with additional field data on the characteristics of Chinese provinces we
were able to demonstrate that employers’ discrimination was correlated with the ac-
tual wage level in the provinces, the ethnic composition in these provinces and whether
the employee originated from the same home province. In addition, we observe that
wages decrease with increasing ruralness of provinces. However, these variables do not
significantly influence the employees’ e↵ort levels, only increasing assigned wages lead
to higher e↵ort.
The fact that the actual wage level in the employees’ home provinces influenced the
wage in our experiment is in line with the fair-wage hypotheses (Akerlof and Yellen,
27In addition, we checked for Experiment II whether the wage decision made in the role of an
employer influenced the e↵ort decision in the role of an employee. Neither the assigned wage to the
home province, nor whether the subject choose discriminating wages influenced the e↵ort decision
significantly. Controlling for both does not change the reported non-results (see Table 12 in the
Appendix).
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1990). In addition, group-identity and in-group favoritism within natural groups can
explain the preferential treatment of employees with the same origin, as well as, lower
wages to employees from provinces with higher ethnic heterogeneity. Overall, our
results are remarkably robust as they are based on data collected in two di↵erent
locations and hold for employers with higher socio-economic status than the employees
(i.e., student employers being matched with migrant workers) as well as for employers
with similar socio-economic background as the employees (i.e., student employers being
matched with student employees).
We investigated the di↵erent motives for wage discrimination in an artefactual set-
ting. Given the extensive debate on the external validity of laboratory studies (e.g.,
Gneezy and List, 2006; Levitt and List, 2007; Cohn et al., 2014; Camerer, 2015; Herbst
and Mas, 2015) the next step should be to replicate our results in a natural environ-
ment. If our results replicate in the field, they would be relevant for the discussion
of anonymous job application procedures in which information on an applicant’s race
or gender is removed from the resume to reduce discrimination in the hiring process
(Hausman, 2012). Previous findings demonstrate that anonymous applications have
the potential to reduce discrimination (A˚slund and Skans, 2012), but also potentially
unindented e↵ects (Krause et al., 2012; Behaghel et al, forth.). Our results suggest,
that already as little as an employee’s origin might provide distinct motives for dis-
crimination.
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A Experimental Procedures
A.1 Recruitment of Subjects in Shanghai:
Recruitment of student participants: At the Vernon-Smith-Lab of the Shanghai
Jiao-Tong University (SJTU) all the subjects were recruited through black boards.
The announcement invited students to participate at a decision making experiment,
in which they could earn money, depending on their decision and the decisions of
others. No further information, besides the date, time, place and duration was given.
The invitation text at the board was in Chinese and there was no connection to an
institution (university, research agency) outside SJTU. To sing-up, students had to
send an email to the person responsible for the recruitment at SJTU. The students
could sign-up to participate in the experiment at the laboratory of the Xuhui Campus
or Minhang Campus of SJTU. Thus students had the opportunity to pick a location
that was the closest to their dorm or classes.
Recruitment of the migrant workers: Eight student helpers (all Chinese) vis-
ited construction sites and cleaning agencies in Shanghai to talk to the gangers of
migrant workers. The assistants explained that we will do a decision-making experi-
ment and that we were looking for randomly recruited migrant workers. Details for
the experiment were not revealed in the explanation. However, the gangers were told
that the participating workers would earn some money based on their decisions and
the decisions of other participants. Furthermore, the helpers asked for a heterogenous
set of workers, coming from di↵erent regions of the PR China, and without a perma-
nent permission to stay in Shanghai. After the gangers understood the purpose of our
request they talked to the management of the construction sites for their permission
and arrange that workers could participate during their rest periods. Depending on the
location of the construction site workers were either sent to the laboratory of Xuhui
Campus or Minhang Campus of SJTU.
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A.2 Recruitment of Subjects in Ningbo:
Students were invited to participate in an online experiment via email. When students
signed-up they received an 10 digit unique identification number which they could later
use to receive their payments from the experiment. When subjects registered for the
experiments they were asked for their home provinces. If a subject was from one of
the excluded municipalities (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin) she was told
that she could unfortunately not participate in the experiment. To participate students
needed a computer with an internet connection to open the website of the experiment.
The details of the experiment were explained on the screen and the instructions were
based on the ones from Shanghai – adjusted for the internet environment and for the
pure student sample. After the experimental sessions, subjects came to the assistant’s
o ce and received their payments based on their unique identification number.
2
A.3 Instructions (translated into English)
Welcome everyone, you are about to participate in an economic experiment. This ex-
periment will last for about forty minutes. If you read the Instructions carefully and
make good decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of money. It is very impor-
tant that you do not talk to other participants for the time of the entire experiment.
In the experiment, each student will be randomly matched with a migrant worker and
the pair forms an employment relationship. Students are the employers and workers
the employees. Each student is endowed with 20 RMB as an initial endowment. From
this endowment, the students decide how much to pay the matched migrant worker
as a wage. Students can condition their wage on the origin of the migrant workers
(the wage should be an integer no less than 11 RMB and no more than 20 RMB).
After receiving the wage, each worker decides to work hard or to work normal for the
matched student. It costs the worker 10 RMB to work hard but generates a profit of
20 RMB for the student, while it costs the worker 5 RMB to work normal generating
a profit of 5 RMB for the student.
Earnings student = 20 RMB - wage paid to worker + profit from worker’s work
Earnings worker = wage received - cost of work
Example: If the student decides to give the worker 15 RMB as a wage, and the worker
decides to work hard, the earnings are:
Earnings student = 20 RMB - 15 RMB + 20 RMB = 25 RMB
Earnings worker = 15 RMB - 10 RMB = 5 RMB
Sequence of the Experiment: (Students)
1. Now that every participant has the instructions and a decision sheet, please put
your code number on the upper-right side of your decision sheet .
2. Please state in your decision sheet the wages you would like to o↵er to workers
from di↵erent provinces (the wage should be an integer no less than 11 RMB and
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no more than 20 RMB). After that, please predict the e↵ort for workers from
each province given the wage you o↵ered.
3. After all decisions have been done our lab assistants will calculate the earnings
of each participant and pay you in cash. In the meantime please fill-out the
distributed questionnaire.
Please raise your hand if you have any further questions.
Sequence of the Experiment: (Migrant Workers)
1. Now that every participant has the instructions and a decision sheet, please put
your code number on the upper-right side of your decision sheet .
2. Please state your origin in the first line of the decision sheet, and your expected
wage from the matched student in the second line.
3. On your decision sheet our lab assistants will write down the wage you received
from the matched student. Please decide if you would like to work normal or
work hard for the student.
4. After all decisions have been done our lab assistants will calculate the earnings pf
each participant and pay in cash. In the meantime please fill-out the distributed
questionnaire.
Please raise your hand if you have any further questions.
4
Table 1: Decision Sheet Employer
Code:
Province Wage to employee You believe Your match
11 Wage  20 employee will work (by assistants)
Sichuan Normal / Hard
Guizhou Normal / Hard
Guangdong Normal / Hard
Zhejiang Normal / Hard
Fujian Normal / Hard
Hunan Normal / Hard
Hubei Normal / Hard
Shandong Normal / Hard
Shanxi Normal / Hard
Henan Normal / Hard
Hebei Normal / Hard
Jilin Normal / Hard
Liaoning Normal / Hard
Heilongjiang Normal / Hard
Anhui Normal / Hard
Jiangsu Normal / Hard
Jiangxi Normal / Hard
Hainan Normal / Hard
Shaanxi Normal / Hard
Yunnan Normal / Hard
Qinghai Normal / Hard
Ningxia Normal / Hard
Gansu Normal / Hard
Xinjiang Normal / Hard
Tibet Normal / Hard
Guangxi Normal / Hard
Neimenggu Normal / Hard
Your matched employee decides to work: Normal / Hard (by assistants)
Your earning is: RMB (by assistants)
5
Table 2: Decision Sheet Migrant Worker
Code:
You are from Province
Your expected wage RMB (11 Wage  20)
The matched student decides to pay you RMB (by assistants)
You decide to work normal / hard
Your total earnings RMB (by assistants)
6
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Figure 2: Assigned wages by employers who do not discriminate
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Note: Roughly 43.9% of employers in Experiment I choose the
same wages for all subjects, 2.4% did so in Experiment II
9
C Tables
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Table 3: Origin Subject Pool - Percentages Per Province
Experiment I Experiment II
Location: Shanghai Ningbo
Students Migrant workers Students
Subjects Subjects Population Subjects Population
Role: Employer Employee Employer/Employee
Anhui 0.07 0.10 0.291 0.018 0.032
Beijing 0.003 0.016
Chongqing 0.025 0.026
Fujian 0.06 0.00 0.030 0.018 0.025
Gansu 0.01 0.00 0.010 0.008 0.014
Guangdong 0.02 0.00 0.009 0.003 0.000
Guangxi 0.00 0.00 0.005 0.011 0.021
Guizhou 0.00 0.00 0.016 0.008 0.016
Hainan 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.000 0.017
Hebei 0.03 0.00 0.008 0.029 0.026
Heilongjiang 0.03 0.01 0.011 0.058 0.072
Henan 0.03 0.45 0.086 0.005 0.018
Hubei 0.07 0.01 0.045 0.016 0.021
Hunan 0.06 0.01 0.025 0.024 0.026
Jiangsu 0.15 0.14 0.169 0.024 0.017
Jiangxi 0.02 0.04 0.054 0.011 0.016
Jilin 0.00 0.01 0.007 0.000 0.017
Liaoning 0.01 0.00 0.007 0.029 0.029
Mongolia 0.01 0.00 0.003 0.011 0.018
Ningxia 0.02 0.00 0.001 0.000 0.013
Qinghai 0.00 0.00 0.001 0.003 0.001
Shaanxi 0.02 0.00 0.013 0.003 0.018
Shandong 0.12 0.02 0.042 0.029 0.033
Shanghai 0.12 0.023
Shanxi 0.01 0.00 0.005 0.013 0.017
Sichuan 0.00 0.05 0.068 0.037 0.028
Tianjin 0.01 0.001 0.039
Tibet 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000
Xinjiang 0.01 0.01 0.003 0.000 0.015
Yunnan 0.02 0.00 0.008 0.013 0.022
Zhejiang 0.07 0.14 0.052 0.632 0.363
Table gives the origins of our subjects and the population the employees were sampled from. The
population of migrant workers is taken from the 2010 Chinese Population Census and gives the
interprovincial floating population in Shanghai. 29.9% of the floating population in Shanghai
comes from Shanghai, the remaining 70.1% originate from the provinces given in the table. In
2015, 21.7% of the students at the University of Nottingham, Nigbo, were international students,
the remaining 78.3% originated from China. The table gives the origins of the Chinese student
population.
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Table 4: Correlation between Province Characteristics
Average Wage Origin % NonHan Origin % Rural Origin GRP Unemployed
% NonHan Origin r=0.4220
p=0.0283
% Rural Origin r=-0.2147 r=0.4435
p=0.2821 p=0.0205
GRP r=0.2999 r=-0.5164 r=-0.5465
p=0.1286 p=0.0058 p=0.0032
Unemployed r=-0.1286 r=-0.6615 r=-0.4045 r=0.7288
p=0.5226 p=0.001 p=0.0364 p<0.001
Population r=-0.0278 r=-0.6015 r=-0.2062 r=0.8581 r=0.8499
p=0.8906 p<0.001 p=0.3020 p<0.001 p<0.001
Table reports coe cients and p-values for pairwise correlations between the variables
from the complimentary field data. Calculations based on the 27 provinces included in this study
12
Table 5: Explaining the Wage in the Experiment
Wage in Experiment Students - Migrant Workers Students - Students
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average Wage Origin 0.400*** 0.338*** 0.175** 1.635*** 1.244*** 0.665***
(0.0623) (0.0715) (0.0718) (0.273) (0.243) (0.192)
Same Origin 0.502** 0.437** 0.382* 1.373*** 1.223*** 1.266***
(0.211) (0.212) (0.211) (0.193) (0.161) (0.146)
% NonHan Origin -1.231*** -1.050*** -0.641*** -3.749*** -2.784*** -1.416***
(0.121) (0.168) (0.187) (0.497) (0.509) (0.381)
% Rural Origin -0.498 0.0419 -3.306*** -3.383***
(0.353) (0.433) (1.033) (1.110)
Trust in Origin 0.0493** 0.0476** 0.101*** 0.116***
(0.0206) (0.0202) (0.0218) (0.0193)
GRP / GDP 0.240** 0.580
(0.0957) (0.390)
Central China -0.277*** -0.175
(0.0669) (0.229)
South China -0.157** 0.00481
(0.0733) (0.230)
Western China -0.268*** -0.602***
(0.0890) (0.208)
Northeast China -0.0708 -0.644**
(0.0893) (0.258)
North China -0.265*** -0.722**
(0.0734) (0.278)
Constant 13.40*** 13.49*** 13.52*** 11.65*** 13.60*** 14.62***
(0.114) (0.323) (0.351) (0.492) (0.915) (0.791)
Employer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,646 2,646 2,646 10,260 10,260 10,260
Subjects 98 98 98 380 380 380
Prob > F p < 0.001 p < 0.001 p < 0.001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.001
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table reports regressions of wage decisions by employers on employees’ province characteristics. All
columns give panel regressions with employer fixed e↵ects and robust clusters on the level of the province
the wage was assigned to.
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Table 6: Explaining the Wage in the Experiment
Wage in Experiment (1) (2) (3)
Average Wage Origin 0.400*** 1.635*** 1.635***
(0.0623) (0.273) (0.273)
Average Wage Origin X Migrantworker -1.235***
(0.267)
Same Origin 0.502** 1.373*** 1.373***
(0.211) (0.193) (0.193)
Same Origin X Migrantworker -0.871**
(0.337)
% NonHan Origin -1.231*** -3.749*** -3.749***
(0.121) (0.497) (0.497)
% NonHan Origin X Migrantworker 2.518***
(0.453)
Constant 13.40*** 11.65*** 12.01***
(0.114) (0.492) (0.400)
Sample Employee: Migrantworker Student Both
Observations 2,646 10,260 12,906
Number of Subjects 98 380 478
Prob > F p < 0.001 p < 0.001 p < 0.001
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table reports regressions of wage decisions by employers on employees’ province char-
acteristics. All columns give panel regressions with employer fixed e↵ects and robust
clusters on the level of the province the wage was assigned to. Model 1 includes only
wages assigned to migrant workers (Experiment I), Model 2 only wages assigned to
students (Experiment II), and Model 3 the data from both Experiments. Migrant-
worker is a dummy variable with a value of one if the employer is matched with
migrant workers.
14
Table 7: Classification of Individual’s Discrimination Patterns
Experiment I Experiment II
Numbers Share Numbers Share
A. Discriminating subjects:
subject discriminates at all 55/98 0.561 371/380 0.976
subjects’ discrimination pattern not identified 4/55 0.073 24/371 0.065
subjects’ discrimination pattern identified 51/55 0.927 347/371 0.935
B. Subjects influenced by Average Wage Origin, Same Origin or % NonHan Origin:
based on only one characteristics 18/55 0.353 94/347 0.271
a. Average Wage Origin 3 0.059 16 0.046
b. Same Origin 14 0.275 55 0.159
c. % NonHan Origin 1 0.020 23 0.066
based on two characteristics 18/55 0.353 171/347 0.493
a. Average Wage Origin and % NonHan Origin 6 0.118 117 0.337
b. Average Wage Origin and Same Origin 3 0.059 12 0.035
c. % NonHan Origin and Same Origin 9 0.176 42 0.121
based on all three characteristics 15/55 0.294 82/347 0.236
To classify the individual type of discrimination, we run for each employer a linear regression. Separately
for each employer, we regress wp = y0 + y1c1p + y2c2p + y3c3p + ✏p with wp being the assigned wage
to a province and c1p, c2p and c3p being the characteristics Average Wage Origin, Same Origin, and %
NonHan Origin. If an estimated coe cent is significant on at least the 10% level we classify this employer
as someone who discriminates based on this motive.
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D Additional Robustness Checks
D.1 Additional Controls: Population and Unemployment
In the regressions reported in the paper we do not control for population size and
unemployment in the employees’ home provinces as they do not improve the fit of the
reported model. For completeness we report the estimations when both are included
as additional controls. Figure 3 gives the distribution of the population sizes and
unemployment numbers for the 27 provinces and regions. Table 8 reports the resulting
estimates when controlling for population and unemployment.
Figure 3: Population and Unemployment in the 27 provinces/regions
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Neither are the coe cients for population and unemployment significant nor do they
substantially improve the R2. In Experiment I the R2 remains unchanged; in Experi-
ment II it is improve by merely 0.06%. The coe cients of our three main explanatory
variables remain relatively stable suggesting that our estimation do not su↵er from
omitted variable bias. However, ruralness is highly correlated with the two variables
16
and because of multicoliniarity its e↵ect turns insignificant.
Table 8: Explaining the Wage in the Experiment
Wage in Experiment Students - Migrant Workers Students - Students
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average Wage Origin 0.175** 0.181** 0.665*** 0.648***
(0.0718) (0.0662) (0.192) (0.218)
Same Origin 0.382* 0.383* 1.266*** 1.270***
(0.211) (0.212) (0.146) (0.140)
% NonHan Origin -0.641*** -0.621** -1.416*** -1.498***
(0.187) (0.256) (0.381) (0.424)
% Rural Origin 0.0419 -0.0238 -3.383*** -2.932
(0.433) (0.849) (1.110) (2.080)
Trust in Origin 0.0476** 0.0474** 0.116*** 0.115***
(0.0202) (0.0201) (0.0193) (0.0180)
Population 6.92e-05 -0.00297
(0.00453) (0.0137)
Unemployed 0.00172 5.68e-05
(0.00388) (0.0152)
Constant 13.52*** 13.53*** 14.62*** 14.43***
(0.351) (0.520) (0.791) (1.271)
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,646 2,646 110,260 10,260
Subjects 98 98 380 380
R2 overall 0.0097 0.0097 0.1558 0.1559
Prob > F p < 0.001 p < 0.001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.001
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table reports regressions of wage decisions by employers on employees’ province character-
istics. All columns give panel regressions with employer fixed e↵ects and robust clusters on
the level of the province the wage was assigned to. Additional controls are the gross regional
product relative to the gross domestic product and region dummies (Central China, East
China, South China, Western China, North China, Northeast China).
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D.2 Additional Controls: Di↵erences in Ruralness
The perceived ruralness of an employee’s home province could potentially be influenced
by the ruralness of the employer’s home province. In the following we run random-
e↵ects regressions with our full set of controls adding the di↵erence in rural population
as an additional control. Our previously reported results remain unchanged, the dif-
ference in ruralness does not influence the wage decision in our experiments.
Table 9: Explaining the Wage in the Experiment
Wage in Experiment Students - Migrant Workers Students - Students
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average Wage Origin 0.175** 0.175** 0.664*** 0.664***
(0.0719) (0.0719) (0.192) (0.192)
Same Origin 0.384* 0.384* 1.274*** 1.274***
(0.219) (0.219) (0.145) (0.146)
% NonHan Origin -0.641*** -0.641*** -1.417*** -1.417***
(0.187) (0.187) (0.382) (0.382)
% Rural Origin 0.0416 0.897 -3.389*** -3.501**
(0.432) (1.635) (1.110) (1.476)
Di↵erence Rural -0.855 0.112
(1.569) (0.957)
Constant 13.52*** 13.11*** 14.65*** 14.71***
(0.425) (0.824) (0.846) (0.962)
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,646 2,646 110,260 10,260
Subjects 98 98 380 380
Prob > F p < 0.001 p < 0.001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.001
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table reports regressions of wage decisions by employers on employees’ province character-
istics. All columns give panel regressions with random e↵ects and robust clusters on the
level of the province the wage was assigned to. Additional controls are the gross regional
product relative to the gross domestic product and region dummies (Central China, East
China, South China, Western China, North China, Northeast China).
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D.3 Additional Controls: Socio-Economic Order
The positive influence on assigned wages could be caused by average wage levels be-
ing correlated with a possible ranking of provinces along socio-economic status. We,
therefore, test whether our results remain robust if we include variables that could cap-
ture such a possible ranking. Table 10 gives the results of these additional robustness
checks for Experiment I and Experiment II. Models 1 and 6 repeat the last estimates
from the main text with employer fixed e↵ects and controls for trust towards province,
percentage of the rural population, the gross regional products in relation to the gross
domestic product, and region dummies for Central China, East China, South China,
Western China, North China, Northeast China.
In Models 2 and 7, we add the ranking of provinces according to the average wage
levels as a discrete variable (Ranking Average Wages). To allow for nonlinearities, we
add dummy variables for the quantiles of the wage ranking in Models 3 and 8. In
Models 4 and 9, we use a ranking of provinces according to the gross regional product
as a discrete variable (Ranking GRP). And again, to allow for nonlinearities we include
dummy variables for the quantiles of the gross regional product ranking in Models 5
and 10.
While all these variables are correlated with the average wage levels in the provinces,
they do not impact the originally reported e↵ect of Average Wage Origin on assigned
wages in the experiments. The levels of significance remain at conventional levels and
the coe cients remain qualitatively similar. In fact, the largest changes are observed
when controlling for the ranking of wage levels, but the ranking actually increase the
estimates for Average Wage Origin instead of reducing them. This implies that the
Average Wage Origin explains the assigned wages better than socio-economic rankings
based on wage levels or gross regional product.
19
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D.4 Additional Controls: Strategy Method
The exclusion of the municipalities (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin) was
based on the rationale that it would be very unlikely for a migrant worker to move
from Beijing to Shanghai. However, the number of employees coming from the re-
maining provinces di↵ers quite substantially between the provinces. Table 3 gives the
distribution of home provinces in our experiments for employers and employees. In
Experiment I, most migrant workers originated from Henan (45%), Zheijiang (14%),
and Jiangsu (14%). In Experiment II, most students originated from Zheijiang (63 %),
Heilongjiang (5.8 %), Sichuan (3.7%). In both experiments, there were provinces from
which no subject originated (e.g., Tibet in both experiments). Thus, some wage deci-
sions were more likely to be realized for the payments than others. This naturally raises
the question if all responses were equally well incentivized and all decisions made with
the same seriousness. In Table 11 we present additional robustness checks. Models 1
and 5 present the results from the main paper with employer fixed e↵ects and the full
set of controls for trust towards province, percentage of the rural population, the gross
regional products in relation to the gross domestic product, and region dummies. In
Models 2 and 6, we apply the most rigorous robustness check by dropping all provinces
from which no employee originated in the corresponding experiment. This reduces the
sample in Experiment I by more than 50%. The p-value for Same Origin drops to
p=0.127 while the p-values for Average Wage Origin and % NonHan Origin remain
on conventional levels of significance. In Experiment II this reduces the sample by
18.5% but the p-values for our main coe cients Average Wage Origin, Same Origin,
and % NonHan Origin remain on conventional levels. In Models 3, 4, 7, and 8 we keep
the whole sample, but include either the variable % In Sample or % In Population to
control for the likelihood of being matched with someone from a province. % In Sample
bases the probability on the distribution in the sample while % In Population bases
the probability on the populations from which the samples were drawn (see Table 3).
21
Results are qualitatively in line with our originally reported results and all e↵ects are
on the same levels of significance as in Models 1 and 5. Therefore, we conclude that our
main e↵ects are qualitatively not influenced by the actual distribution of employee’s
home provinces in our sample.
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D.5 Additional Controls: Influences on second stage behavior
In Experiment II subjects first decided in the role of employers and then decided in
the role of employees. While they did not receive feedback after the first stage it is
still possible that the first stage behavior influenced the second stage behavior. In
Table D.5 we add controls for their first stage decisions. The variable Employer: Wage
assigned is the wage the subject assigned to employees from the same province in the
first stage. Employer: Discriminated is a dummy variable which values turns one if
the subject discriminated as an employer. Neither do these two variables influence
the decision to exert high e↵ort, nor does the inclusion change any of the previously
reported non-results.
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Table 12: Explaining the Effort in Experiment II
Prob(High E↵ort) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Wage in Experiment 1.0343*** 1.0343*** 1.0343*** 1.0343***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Worker’s Origin Real Wage -0.1559 -0.1283 -0.1563 -0.1282
(0.413) (0.417) (0.413) (0.417)
Worker’s Origin % NonHan 2.9427 2.8764 2.9461 2.8811
(2.082) (2.087) (2.083) (2.087)
Worker’s Origin % Rural -4.0650 -4.1274 -4.0809 -4.1616
(2.582) (2.585) (2.596) (2.601)
Worker Female -0.2532 -0.2649 -0.2525 -0.2638
(0.289) (0.290) (0.289) (0.290)
Worker’s Age 0.0038 0.0036 0.0037 0.0035
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Employer: Wage assigned -0.0226 -0.0234
(0.048) (0.048)
Employer: Discriminated 0.1023 0.2075
(1.721) (1.735)
Constant -14.5151*** -14.1575*** -14.5075*** -14.1305***
(2.178) (2.304) (2.182) (2.315)
Observations 3,800 3,800 3,800 3,800
Number of UID 380 380 380 380
Prob >  2 0 0 0 0
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Random-e↵ects logistic regression explaining e↵ort decision in Experiment II.
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E A Model
Here we introduce a formal model describing the employees’ (E) and the employers’
(R) decision. The model is designed to resemble as closely as possible the environment
for the participants of the experiment.
Decision structure, timing, and beliefs
The timing of the moves mirrors the experiment described in section 2 of the paper
and Appendix A. Upon meeting, employee i reveals his origin, i.e. in which province
P employee i was born. This is the only piece of information that is exchanged. After
learning the employee’s origin pi 2 P , the employer forms beliefs Fj about the lowest
wage wFi (ai, pi) that the employee regards as a fair compensation for working hard,
where ai denotes additional, exogenous information such as the average wage in a
certain province or the share of Non-Han Chinese living in the province. On the basis
of these beliefs, the employer will o↵er employee i a wage wj. The wage wj can take
values on the interval [wmin, wmax] = [11, 20] in our experiment. After the employer
made the wage o↵er, the employee decides on whether to work hard (ei = 1) or normal
(ei = 0).
We follow Akerlof (1982) in assuming that employees compare wage o↵ers wj to
what they regard as a fair compensation for a high e↵ort. Naturally, the notion of a
fair compensation e.g. depends on previously received wages, unemployment benefits,
work norms and wages paid to reference groups. While most of Akerlof’s determinants
of a fair wage are irrelevant in our setting, wages paid to a reference group are highly
relevant and are derived from the average wage levels in the home province pi of worker
i. After all, a migrant worker would only move to a di↵erent province if s/he expects
to earn more than in her home province. The precise functional relationship between
the actual wage level in the home province and the wage level wFi worker i regards
as a fair compensation is unknown and may di↵er between individuals from the same
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province. However, it is reasonable to assume that wFi increases with the average wage
level in province pi.
Employers are aware that employees are only willing to exert a high work e↵ort if the
employer o↵ers a wage higher than the employee’s notion of a fair wage wFi (·). However,
the only piece of information exchanged prior to the wage o↵er is the home province of
the employee i. Therefore, employers form their beliefs Fj about employee i’s notion
of a fair wage on the information of the home province pi and the associated publicly
available information about this home province, such as the average wage, the share
of Non-Han Chinese or the unemployment rate. Assume that employee i is prepared
to work hard for wages wj   wFi (·). Then, F pij (wj; ·) denotes the probability that the
wage o↵er wj indeed exceeds i’s notion of a fair wage wFi (·). We impose only one
restriction upon the employers’ beliefs, the beliefs F pij (wj; ·) are strictly unimodal with
an expected value µpij = µj(a(pi)) and variance  
pi
j . Hence, employer j forms beliefs
about the expected value of employee i’s fair wage on the basis of publicly available
information about the province pi. Consequently, expected fair wage levels µ
pi
j will
di↵er depending on the migrant workers’ home province. We allow each employer j to
form his/her own beliefs upon the expected fair wage µpij as well as the accuracy of
their beliefs,  pij , i.e. two employers may well disagree about µ
pi
j and  
pi
i .
Employees’ decision
Given the decision structure, information and timing as described above, it is clear that
the notion about what constitutes a fair wage is unique to each individual employee. Of
course we assume that certain patterns can be observed as e.g. a positive correlation
between the average wage in a province and the fair wage. However two employees
from the same province do not necessarily have the same fair wage.
The basis of any gift exchange as described above is that the recipient of the ini-
tial gift derives a positive utility from reciprocal behaviour. We therefore follow Falk
and Fischbacher (2006) in modifying the employees’ objective function to allow for
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reciprocal behavior. Let employee i’s objective function be given by
UEi (ei, wj, w
F
i (·)) = ⇡Ei + ⇢i
 
wj   wFi (·)
 
⇡Rj ,
where ⇡Ei and ⇡
R
j are the payo↵s for employee i and employer j respectively. ⇢i is a
positive constant which measures the strength of i’s reciprocal feelings, i.e. the second
expression on the right hand side of the objective function. The reciprocal component
itself is comprised of what Falk and Fischbacher (2006) call the kindness term, here
wj   wFi (·), and the reciprocation term, here ⇡Rj .
After the employer made a specific wage o↵er wj, the employee decides on the e↵ort
s/he wants to exert. Given the employee’s utility function, the employee will work hard
only if
 UEi := U
E
i
 
ei = 1, wj, w
F
i (·)
   UEi  ei = 0, wj, wFi (·)    0,
otherwise employees will work with normal work e↵ort. Let yH = y(ei = 1) (yL =
y(ei = 0)) denote an employee’s productivity when s/he exerts the high (normal) work
e↵ort. Then, the payo↵s for the employees and employers simplified to ⇡Ei = wj  c(ei)
and ⇡Rj = y(ei) wj respectively (see also above) so that  UEi can be determined with
 UEi =   c+ ⇢i
 
wj   wFi (·)
  
yH   yL ,
where  c = c(ei = 1)   c(ei = 0) > 0 is the di↵erence in disutility that a high e↵ort
requires compared to a normal e↵ort. Since yH yL as well as  c is positive, employees
will work hard if
wj    c
⇢i(yH   yL) + w
F
i (ai, pi) =: w
H
i (ai, pi)
Therefore, an employee will only consider to work hard if the wage o↵er is su ciently
higher than the fair wage wFi (·).
wFi and therefore w
H
i are unknown to the employer. However, employers form beliefs
about wFi and therefore w
H
i and are perfectly aware that the above inequality is more
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easily satisfied when the wage o↵er wj is higher. This result mirrors our Hypothesis 4
above. It is also obvious that higher levels of a fair compensation wFi induces a lower
work e↵ort for every given wage o↵er wj. This is expressed in our Hypothesis 5 above
(see also Falk and Fischbacher, 2006).
To summarize, the optimal work e↵ort is
e⇤i =
8><>:1 if wj   w
H
i ,
0 if wj < wHi .
Employers’ decision
Employers are aware of the employees inclination to only work hard if the wage o↵er
exceeds the employee’s notion of a fair wage. However, employers have no way of
ascertaining the level wFi for an employee. Hence, the employer has to form beliefs
about the employee’s fair wage wFi and w
H
i on the basis of the employee’s home province
pi. Unless the employer o↵ers the maximum wage wmax, there will always be a positive
probability that the wage o↵er will be lower than the fair wage wHi and that the
employee exerts only the normal work e↵ort. Consequently, employee i’s productivity
is uncertain as long as wj < wmax. Let yH and yL be defined as above. Then, the
expected profits for employer j can be written as
E ⇡Rj = F
pi
j (wj; ai)(y
H   wj)+
 
1  F pij (wj; ai)
 
(yL   wj).
Since F pij (wj; ai) denotes the probability that the fair wage w
F
i  wj, employee i will
exerts the high work e↵ort and displays the high productivity yH . With the residual
probability 1   F pij (wj; ai) employee i’s fair wage is higher than the wage o↵er wj so
that employee i will display the low productivity yL.
Similar to employees, employers base their decision on the wage o↵er not exclusively
on the expected profit. Employers might derive positive utility from being sympathetic
29
to employees from the same province. Let 1pj(pi) denote the indicator function
1pj(pi) =
8><>:1 if pj = pi 2 P,0 if pj 6= pi 2 P,
i.e. the function takes the value one if the employee and the employer are from the
same province and zero otherwise. Then, employer j’s objective function is given by
URj = E ⇡
R
j + ↵j1pj(pi)wj
= F pij (wj; ·)(yH   wj) +
 
1  F pij (wj; ·)
 
(yL   wj) + ↵j1pj(pi)wj
where ↵j1pj(pi)wj is the utility that employer j derives from paying an employee from
the same home province as himself a higher wage.
An employer chooses wj so that his/her utility is maximised. The first and second
order conditions are given by
@URj
@wj
= F pijwj(wj; ·)(yH   yL)  1 + ↵j1pj(pi)  0,
@2URj
@w2j
= F pijwjwj(wj; ·)(yH   yL)  0.
Since yH yL is always positive, the second-order condition is only satisfied, if F pijwjwj(wj; ·) 
0, i.e. if the employer o↵ers a wage wj that is larger than his/her expectation of the
fair wage µpij for employee from province pi. According to the first-order condition, the
optimal wage o↵er wj has to satisfy
f pij (wj; ·) =
1  ↵j1pj(pi)
yH   yL (1)
where f pij (wj; ·) is the density function associated with the belief function F pij (wj; ·).
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The optimal wage o↵er
As previously discussed, the employer has to form beliefs about an employee’s notion of
a fair wage compensation on the basis of the only piece of information s/he has — the
home province pi. We assumed that the belief functions F
pi
j (wj; ·) is strictly unimodal
with an expected value of µpij . Naturally, publicly available information about the
provinces will influence the belief structure {F sj }s2P . It is reasonable to assume that
the expected value µpij equals the average wage in the province pi. Then, it follows
directly from the second-order condition above that the o↵ered wage wj will be higher
when the average wage µpij increases, which is summarized in Hypothesis 1 above.
Since f pijwj < 0 to satisfy the second-order condition, employers are prepared to pay
higher wages to employees from their own home province according to equation (1).
The stronger the attachment to their own province, i.e. the larger ↵j, the higher will
be the wage o↵ered to an employee from an employer’s own home province. This is
summarized in Hypothesis 2 above.
Finally, in Hypothesis 3 we state our belief that wage o↵ers will decline as the
shares of Non-Han Chinese in the employees’ home province is increasing. Let ai stand
for the share of Non-Han Chinese in i’s home province pi. From equation (1) follows
immediately, that the optimal wage o↵er changes with an increasing share of Non-Han
Chinese according to
dwj
dai
=   @f
pi
j (wj; ai)/@ai
@f pij (wj; ai)/@wj
< 0.
The wage o↵er will on decrease with an increasing share of Non-Han Chinese in the
province if @f pij /@ai < 0. If the average wage is on average lower in provinces with a
higher share on Non-Han Chinese which we indeed observe, then this condition will be
satisfied.
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